Formal Models of Authoritarian Politics and Conflict
Autocrats face armed threats to their survival in power. Attempts to co-opt such threats create a dilemma of authoritarian power sharing. Attempts to repress such threats create agency problems such as the guardianship dilemma. My work improves our understanding of these foundational strategic interactions within authoritarian regimes by developing new game-theoretic models with empirical applications to settings ranging from postcolonial Africa to historical Europe. Contributions include:
• Illuminating how the autocrat's and opposition's commitment problems impede authoritarian power-sharing deals.
• Highlighting the relationship between authoritarian power sharing and democratization.
• Uncovering novel effects of external threats on coups and the development of executive constraints.
• Providing new insights into the conflict resource curse.
For a longer description of the project, SEE HERE (last updated August 2026).
Published
The Threat-Enhancing Effect of Authoritarian Power Sharing
American Journal of Political Science, in press
APSA Formal Theory – Award for Best Paper at APSA 2024 Annual Meeting
Formal Theory: Strategies of Authoritarian Survival and Power
(with Scott Tyson) Prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics, forthcoming
A Comment on Powell and Formal Models of Power Sharing
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2024, 36(2): 212–233.
JOURNAL LINK • POWELL ARTICLE • MEMORIAM AT POLITICAL SCIENCE TODAY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies
(with Anne Meng and Robert Powell) Annual Review of Political Science, 2023, 26: 153–173.
Stronger Challengers can Cause More (or Less) Conflict and Institutional Reform
(with Andrew Little) Comparative Political Studies, 57(3): 486–505.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • TWITTER
A Theory of External Wars and European Parliaments
International Organization, 2023, 77(1): 102–143. (with Brenton Kenkel)
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • SLIDES • TWITTER
Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators
American Political Science Review, 2022, 116(4): 1425–1442.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • REPLICATION DATA • TWITTER
Strategic Power Sharing: Commitment, Capability, and Authoritarian Survival
Journal of Politics, 2022, 84(2): 1226–1232.
JOURNAL LINK • NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY • APPENDIX • TWITTER
Strategic Civil War Aims and the Resource Curse
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2022, 17(2): 183–221.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • TWITTER
The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma: Countering Dual Outsider Threats
American Journal of Political Science, 2021, 65(2): 510–527.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Ethnic Violence in Africa: Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States
International Organization, 2019, 73(3): 645–683.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • REPLICATION DATA • NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Economic Grievances and Civil War: An Application to the Resource Curse
International Studies Quarterly, 2019, 63(2): 244–258. JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX
Rethinking the Conflict Resource Curse: How Oil Wealth Prevents Center-Seeking Civil Wars
International Organization, 2016, 70(4): 727–761. JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • REPLICATION DATA
In progress
2Powerful2Share: Threat Capabilities and Self-Enforcing Power Sharing
Democratization Can Solve the Perils of Authoritarian Power Sharing