Authoritarian Power Sharing
All dictators confront threats to their survival in office. One strategy to mitigate threats is to share power with challengers. For example, a ruler can offer positions in the cabinet or legislature to co-opt members of mass societal opposition organizations or of different ethnic groups. Sharing power enhances the ruler’s commitment to promises. However, by bringing challengers closer to the center of power and bolstering their coercive capability, sharing power creates a threat-enhancing effect. High-ranking elites can exercise their ability to stage a coup to remove the leader, rather than using this leverage as a latent threat to prevent the ruler from transgressing on promised spoils. The dual consequences of power sharing are foundational for understanding authoritarian politics and regime survival. I develop the theoretical mechanisms across several applied game theory articles, and I also provide evidence from post-colonial Africa and historical Europe. A longer overview of the project is available here.
Published
Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies
(with Anne Meng and Robert Powell) Annual Review of Political Science, 2023, 26: 153–173.
MEMORIAM FOR BOB POWELL AT POLITICAL SCIENCE TODAY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
Stronger Challengers can Cause More (or Less) Conflict and Institutional Reform
(with Andrew Little) Forthcoming at Comparative Political Studies
JOURNAL LINK • TWITTER
A Theory of External Wars and European Parliaments
International Organization, 2023, 77(1): 102–143. (with Brenton Kenkel)
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • SLIDES • TWITTER
Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators
American Political Science Review, 2022, 116(4): 1425–1442.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • REPLICATION DATA • TWITTER
Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma
(with Anne Meng) American Political Science Review, 2022, 116(4): 1208–1225.
JOURNAL LINK • MAIN APPENDIX • CODING APPENDIX • REPLICATION DATA • SLIDES • TWITTER
Strategic Power Sharing: Commitment, Capability, and Authoritarian Survival
Journal of Politics, 2022, 84(2): 1226–1232.
JOURNAL LINK • NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY • APPENDIX • TWITTER
The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma: Countering Dual Outsider Threats
American Journal of Political Science, 2021, 65(2): 510–527.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Ethnic Violence in Africa: Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States
International Organization, 2019, 73(3): 645–683.
JOURNAL LINK • APPENDIX • REPLICATION DATA • NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In progress
Power Sharing with Weak Institutions: A Comment on Powell
Conditionally accepted, Journal of Theoretical Politics
Commitment Problems Don’t Cause Conflict When Threats Arise Endogenously