The second set of articles and papers, mainly empirical, examine historical causes of wars and democracy. Topics include long-term legacies of pre-colonial statehood, domestic and international consequences of colonial European settlement, and British colonialism. I teach courses on applied game theory (graduate), authoritarian politics (undergraduate), and research methods for honors students (undergraduate).
I completed my Ph.D. in political science and Master's degree in economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and received a B.A. with Highest Distinction from the University of Virginia. Outside of research, I enjoy watching sports even though my teams usually lose (the joys of Mets fandom), and spending time outside (running, biking, hiking, softball).
I am an assistant professor in the political science department at the University of Rochester. My research lies at the intersection of applied game theory, comparative politics, and international relations, and has been published in or is accepted at Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics, and World Politics. The broad theme of most of my applied game theory research addresses why authoritarian governments often pursue strategic actions that make civil war more likely. The main application is to explain the conflict resource curse. A series of articles and papers using conflict bargaining models explain why higher national-level oil wealth decreases prospects for center-seeking civil wars but also why oil-rich regions fight separatist civil wars relatively frequently. Related projects present game theoretic models of authoritarian survival and state-building strategies.